"Inner Mongolian Operations"
Sino-Japanese War Scenario #2:
The Japanese campaign for the Peiping-Suiyan Railway
v1.0
Designed for:
Norm Koger's Operational Art of War Volume I
Designed by John H. Ebert
1. Introductory Remarks
Well, after an extended hiatus of more
than a year, I have finally finished the second of (hopefully) many more
Sino-Japanese war scenarios. During this time I have had contact
with a fairly large number of people and have learned a great deal more
about the conflict than I knew back in July of 1998. As a result,
a few changes in my procedure and methods deserve to be explained:
This scenario has been in a nearly-finished form for almost a year. Many follow-up e-mails have asked what I had planned next, and I am sorry to have delayed its release for as long as I have. Life has a way of getting in the way of things like this...we've since bought a home, visited the in-laws in Japan, and changed jobs since the first scenario was released. In any case, please enjoy this scenario, and feel free to pass along any comments or suggestions for future scenarios. The campaign for Shanghai and Nanking is in the works…as of 2/1/00, the map is 80% finished and the order of battle is being planned...I look forward to a summer release of this next scenario.
Many thanks to Mark Royer, designer of the peerless and superlative "paper" game, "War of Resistance" (produced by Game Research/Design Company, 1998) for his assistance in putting right some of the fudging and guesses I had been forced to make in the previous version of the scenario. To the researcher, gamer, or historian of this mostly unknown war, Mark Royer's game is almost indescribably complete and solid in every important way. At around $100, it's a steal...I'd have paid far more for it! It's fairly rare, and I don't imagine they've printed many more than several thousand copies, but don't let that stop you...buy this game!!
Other contributions via e-mail have been similarly appreciated...thanks to all of you for your kind and helpful comments. Please excuse the long delays between scenarios!
3. Historical facts, contemporary shortcomings:
Overall, I feel this scenario is fairly accurate. The behavior and tenacity of the Chinese Communist units is the one thing I am not satisfied with…as they more or less behave as any other unit in the game. In reality, they're the only Chinese formations that consistently fought with any real imagination or gusto, and came to be feared by smaller Japanese formations that roamed the countryside in guerrilla suppression campaigns.
Come the end of the scenario, players may notice their supply lines becoming a little stretched…get used to this, because it's not going to get any better as the war drags on. Indeed, this engagements depicted in this scenario may well have been looked upon as the "good old days" once the fighting moved farther and farther into the hinterlands and away from established lines of communication. The Japanese quickly realized the difficulty of "living off the land" when three or four million Chinese regularly died a year of starvation in a "good" year.
4. Questions of Balance
Yes, again, the game is a bit hard for the Chinese player…but then again, that’s historical. On the other hand, the Japanese cannot afford to fritter away his resources in ill-conceived attacks in this scenario…this campaign is far less forgiving of losses than the first strike at the Chinese near Peiping. Once the Chinese defense slacks off, the Japanese player will have a freer hand to move about as he wishes, but initially, if they choose to, the Chinese can put up a fairly tough scrap…
5. TOAW Soapbox
Since it's possible that fewer people played the 1.1 revision of the Peiping-Tientsin scenario than who played the 1.0 version (they missed out on some nice tweaks), such people also missed the following rant. For the sake of those people and to preempt any re-occurance of silliness that was unleashed last time I released a Sino-Japanese war scenario, I will re-post.
I’d like to briefly and indirectly take up an issue in the hopes that anyone who might feel compelled to "educate" me as to how "evil" the Japanese were during this war might consider taking a long walk of a short pier, instead.
Part of what makes the study of history so enjoyable is the fact that history is precisely what we are studying…past events. Several letters writers have expressed "indignation" or "outrage" over the fact I chose to use a respected Japanese-authored biography of the Japanese foreign minister, Koki Hirota, or the often China-critical biographical history of the war written by General Stillwell’s close friend and colleague (Frank Dorn), as opposed to "more Chinese sources."
None of these dissenting voices seemed to notice that I did, in fact, use the official English history of the war as written by the "exiled" Republic of China, (Taiwan). They also ignore the fact that author Frank Dorn was actually in China during the campaign this scenario attempts to re-create, and frequently heaps scorn and dissenting comment upon the "official" Chinese version of events.
All things being equal, his scorn for and criticism of the "official" Chinese spin has more credibility in my mind than any combination of Chinese tomes, considering the course of events after the war and the volume of reading I have done using sources written before, during, and after the war.
I personally feel that hotheaded "outrage" or "indignation" over events some six decades old is a bit much; feelings of that sort might more appropriately be replaced with "solemn remembrance" or something dignified and intelligent. Too much to ask, perhaps, but this is how Americans at large tend to deal with things like the Pearl Harbor bombing.
Most people today are able to distinguish between past and present, and are thus able to enjoy historical study and simulation without guilt or a feeling of "betraying the memories" of war victims, Chinese or Japanese, civilian or otherwise.
Some people, however, are unable not only to study the
past without excessive emotion, but also are not skilled enough critical
thinkers to separate the surviving remnants of wartime propaganda that
still litter the historical literature from true tales of actual atrocity.
The result is muddled, uncritical, and excessively rancorous rhetoric on
the part of those demonstrably least in the know. More than any
past victims, it is these modern know-nothings that excite my sincere
pity.
Version 1.0 2/5/2000, Tested under TOAW v1.04.08
John H. Ebert, jebert3@ibm.net